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John H. Welch’s paper provides a reminder that the evaluation of natural language arguments,
understood as abstract inferential objects rather than as dialectical processes, ever appeals to
some normative standard. Next to the more commonly distinguished standards of deductive
soundness and inductive cogency, Welch particularly addresses the—far less-often discussed, but
therefore prima facie no less important—standard of plausibilistic credibility. His paper shows
how this standard can be operationalized, moreover treats the projection of numerical
measurement-values of plausibilistic credibility onto natural language terms, here also dealing
with imprecise measurement, and critically points to incomparability issues.
The basic idea motivating his title is this: cognitive agents do not simply endorse, or
believe, premises or conclusions tout court! They rather tend to “hedge” them, in the sense that a
speaker as much as a hearer attends to their cognitive contents as a matter of degree—thus
treating any such content as expressing less than a thesis, i.e., a hypothesis. The very idea, of
course, sits well with current research in epistemology, where talk of “degrees of belief” has by
now become so normal that few still take issue with it. This at least holds broadly, the sole
current exception perhaps being the formally as well as interpretation-wise extremely powerful,
formal framework of ‘ranking functions’ (Spohn, 2012), where the dynamics of differentially
retractable full beliefs are modelled at ordinal scale-level, rather than partial beliefs being
modeled at ratio scale-level. But let this pass!
Welch’s constructive contribution is to have offered an operationalization of plausibilistic
credibility. He proceeds by distinguishing two qualities of an argument, ARG, itself consisting of
premise- and conclusion-statements, namely ARG’s inductive strength (I), on one hand, and—
more narrowly—the epistemic strength (E) of its premises, on the other. Here, I measures the
extent to which ARG’s premises confer support onto its conclusion in the standard inductive
sense of probability-raising. Hence, the probability of the conclusion given the premises, or the
reasons, that are offered in support of C, in form: P1(C|P), must exceed the probability of the
conclusion simpliciter, in form: P0(C), so that P1(C)=P1(C|P)>tP0(C) holds whenever the
premises do in fact lend such support to the conclusion. (The subscripts 0 and 1 indicate prior
and posterior probabilities and where, normally, the threshold t0.5.) In fact, Welch demands for
inductive cogency, and similarly for plausibilistic credibility, that P1(C|PRE)>P1(C*|PRE),
where C* is a distinct conclusion, while PRE is the same premise set, for any C*.
Besides this otherwise standard condition of inductive support, which currently is a “hip
item” in the so-called ‘Bayesian approach to argumentation’, E provides a distinct measure for
what Welch calls the ‘epistemic probability’ of the premises—something not considered as a
distinct measure in the Bayesian approach, but to some extent implicitly conceded there as well
(see below). Broadly, “Bayesians” consider the probability-value that is assigned to a given
premise or conclusion to express the amount of doubt one entertains with respect to the content
of a given statement.
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Drawing both measures, E and I, together—either of which may also be called a
dimension—then guides the overall evaluation of an argument, in the sense that “[j]oint
consideration of these dimensions [E, I] yields a reasoned view of the degree of credence
appropriate to the argument’s conclusion” (p. 2). As Welch also shows, one obtains limiting-case
relations such that, if premises are true, then deductive soundness is a limiting-case of inductive
cogency, which in turn is a limiting-case of plausibilistic credibility. For whenever the Emeasure assigns the value “true” to an argument’s premise-set, then deductive soundness is the
upper limit of inductive strength in virtue of having assigned a maximal value on the I-measure,
and similarly, he suggests, when inductive strength is the upper limit of plausibilistic credibility.
Crucially, since one now employs two measures in argument-evaluation, I and E, one
needs to prepare for the expectable, namely: incomparability, in the sense that, for ARG-1 we
may have it that the E-value>I-value, while for ARG-2 we may have it that the I-value>E-value,
independently of whether these values are expressed quantitatively (in numbers) or qualitatively
(in words). However, no principled solution to genuine incomparability is known.
Now seeking after a critical comment, consider this perhaps over-naïve question: why
does the distinction between E and I seek to mirror the distinction between the content and the
form of an argument, being itself all too familiar from deductive inference (see p. 9)? That is,
why attempt evaluating I and E independently, and then seek ways of aggregating the E- and the
I-result into a final evaluation. The Bayesian program, by contrast, avoids just this, and goes
straight for the content! (See, e.g., Hahn & Corner, 2013.) Here, one considers P() as resulting
from an amalgamation of whatever considerations “go into” subjectively evaluating the credence
value for a premise, and similarly considers P(|) as resulting from such an amalgamation for a
conditional belief, i.e., for the dynamic case. This occurs on the assumption that degrees of belief
in a conclusion (but at times also in the premises) change as reasoned responses to the contents
that the premises convey. This program, then, would not, I take it, be very impressed by an
attempt at separating epistemic considerations from inductive considerations. One would rather
seek to consider the “epistemic side of the coin” as having to do with premise statics, and the
inductive side as having to do with the support that premises confer, i.e., as a dynamic issue,
which in turn will lead to changes in epistemic matters. So both aspects here remain (deeply)
intertwined, and yet produce an evaluation of any argument in terms of a final degree of belief in
its conclusion, given a degree of belief in the premises. This evaluation can then be compared to
that of other arguments based on the same, or partially, or entirely different premises.
This is an open forum, of course. So I would like to invite the author—whose paper, no
doubt, has taught me—to perhaps reply in ways that might fill the void this commentator is left
with. In brief: Why exactly go this route? Plus, what might a worked out example look like?
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